The CCA\u2019s Ominous Avoidance of Valuation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThe CCA does not say how to value the purported gifts, stating in another footnote that \u201calthough the determination of the values of the gifts requires complex calculations, Child and Child\u2019s issue cannot escape gift tax on the basis that the value of the gift is difficult to calculate.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Earlier, in the section titled \u201cLaw,\u201d the CCA includes this paragraph:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cSection 25.2511-2(a) [of the Gift Tax Regulations] provides that the gift tax is not imposed upon the receipt of the property by the donee, nor is it necessarily determined by the measure of enrichment resulting to the donee from the transfer. Rather, it is a tax upon the donor\u2019s act of making the transfer. The measure of the gift is the value of the interest passing from the donor with respect to which they have relinquished their rights without full and adequate consideration in money or money\u2019s worth.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Like most CCAs and letter rulings, the CCA makes no immediate or specific application of that paragraph and therefore offers little help with valuation \u2013 basically just redundantly reciting that the value \u201cis the value.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Still earlier in the \u201cLaw\u201d section, the CCA ominously quotes Reg. \u00a725.2511-1(e) for the proposition that \u201cif the donor\u2019s retained interest is not susceptible of measurement on the basis of generally accepted valuation principles, the gift tax is applicable to the entire value of the property subject to the gift.\u201d Again, though, there is no elaboration, and thus the statement is not very helpful. The context of Reg. \u00a725.2511-1(e) is a transfer by gift of \u201cless than [the donor\u2019s] entire interest in property,\u201d which is awkward to apply to a case in which the purported gift is actually a purported transfer by the donees back to the donor. In any event, taxing the beneficiaries on the entire value of the trust property in the case of this CCA is an outcome that seems simply too extreme to be entertained, even under the surprising aggressiveness of this CCA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sections 2701 and 2702<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nThere are provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, such as sections 2701 and 2702, that are intended and presumably designed to target gifts of less than the transferor\u2019s entire interest in the property, but they may not offer much help. For one thing, section 2701 applies to gifts to \u201ca member of the transferor\u2019s family,\u201d which seems quite inclusive, except that under section 2701(e)(1) it is limited to the transferor\u2019s spouse, descendants of the transferor or the transferor\u2019s spouse, and spouses of such descendants. It would not apply to the purported transfer here by the child and grandchildren of the grantor to their parent or grandparent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Section 2702 does apply to transfers to ancestors, under section 2704(c)(2)(B) (incorporated by section 2702(e)), but its focus under section 2702(a)(1) on the retention<\/em> of interests only by the transferor and \u201capplicable family members\u201d (the transferor\u2019s spouse and their ancestors<\/em> or ancestors\u2019 spouses, under section 2701(e)(2)) reflects the focus on transfers to younger generations with interests retained by older generations.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThat is confirmed by the fact that every example in the section 2702 regulations that identifies a transferee mentions only children, or in a couple instances the spouse, of the transferor. See<\/em> Reg. \u00a7\u00a725.2702-2(d), 25.2702-3(e), 25.2702-4(d), 25.2702-5(d), and 25.2702-6(c). To be fair, those examples may simply reflect the types of transfers that are most common. But they are consistent with the traditional focus on transfers to younger<\/em> generations illustrated, for example, in Rev. Rul. 81-264, 1981-2 C.B. 185, which held that the running of a state statute of limitations on recovery of a demand loan and accrued interest resulted in a taxable gift by \u201cD\u201d (the lender) to \u201cA\u201d (D\u2019s child<\/em>). The ruling showed its preoccupation with transfers to lower generations by reasoning (emphasis added):<\/p>\n\n\n\n\u201cHere, as in all such familial transactions, there is a presumption that the transfer of wealth from D to A without consideration is not entirely free of donative intent. \u2026 A had the resources to pay the debt, and, as D\u2019s child<\/em>, was the natural object of D\u2019s bounty<\/em>. On these facts<\/em>, D\u2019s failing to enforce the debt obligation and permitting it to be barred by the statute has not been shown to be free of donative intent.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\nMoreover, except under section 2702(a)(3)(ii) and (b) where an interest in a personal residence or an annuity or unitrust interest is involved (which don\u2019t appear to be applicable to the reimbursement of income tax paid), the result under section 2702(a)(2)(A) is apparently that the beneficiaries could be treated as making taxable gifts equal to the entire value of the trust assets (an outcome, as stated above, that seems simply too extreme to be entertained), or perhaps only the value of their particular interests at the time (which seems very difficult to determine).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Radical Alternative: Section 2519<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nSection 2519 is another Code section that in effect could impose gift tax on the entire value of the assets in a trust \u2013 in this case a QTIP trust if the surviving spouse disposes of only the spouse\u2019s life interest, which is only a part<\/em> of the trust. In fact, section 2519 would treat even the \u201cdisposition of \u2026 part<\/em> of a qualifying income interest for life\u201d as a disposition of the entire<\/em> interest in the trust apart from that income interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe potential mischief of such a rule is illustrated in Chief Counsel Advice 202118008 (issued Feb. 1, 2021; released May 7, 2021), in which the IRS ruled that the agreement of the surviving spouse and the deceased spouse\u2019s children (as remainder beneficiaries and as virtual representatives of the contingent and unborn beneficiaries) to distribute all the assets of a QTIP trust to the spouse (in what the CCA called a \u201ccommutation\u201d) resulted in both (1) a disposition of the surviving spouse\u2019s qualifying income interest under section 2519(a), and thus, the surviving spouse\u2019s gift of all of the interests in the trust other than the qualifying income interest, and (2) a gift by the remainder beneficiaries of their remainder back to the spouse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
By not permitting any offset of those two opposite or circular gifts, CCA 202118008 attracted considerable attention from estate planners, as imposing unnecessary double taxation. Indeed, on the same day as the commutation, the spouse transferred assets, some by gift and some (including assets received from the QTIP trust in the commutation) in exchange for promissory notes, to irrevocable dynasty trusts that the spouse had created for the benefit of the children and their descendants. Those transfers, plus the observation that other assets received in the commutation and retained by the spouse would be subject to estate tax at the spouse\u2019s death, escalated some of the reactions to a perception of triple<\/em> taxation.<\/p>\n\n\n\nNevertheless, the Chief Counsel\u2019s Office seemed to have no problem concluding in CCA 202118008 that \u201cthe QTIP statutory scheme and legislative history support the view that \u2026 the separate transfers by Spouse and Children cannot be offset by consideration for tax purposes.\u201d There is no similar \u201cstatutory scheme\u201d applicable in CCA 202352018, which cites nothing but generally applicable gift tax regulations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Challenge of Gift Tax Valuation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nOne way to deal with the valuation challenge might be to treat any reimbursement pursuant to the modified trust terms as a gift by the beneficiaries when that reimbursement is made. But that is just not the way the gift tax works. It depends on projections, maybe actuarial factors, and math \u2013 \u201ccomplex calculations,\u201d as the footnote in the CCA puts it. Perhaps appraisals, although an appraisal would undoubtedly raise issues of extraordinary assumptions, hypothetical conditions, and limiting conditions (imposed by the CCA itself) that at a minimum would require disclosure in any appraisal report under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), and, together with the absence of any \u201ccomparable sale\u201d data, might also discourage a qualified appraiser from undertaking the engagement in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Challenge of Allocating the Gift Among Potential Donors<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nAnd even if the creation of the discretionary reimbursement authority can be credibly viewed as a gift and credibly valued for gift tax purposes, the allocation of that value among the current, future, contingent, and even unborn beneficiaries would pose still another challenge \u2013 not to mention how an unborn beneficiary could be required to file a gift tax return or be liable for gift tax. Ironically, the CCA itself seems to envision gift tax liability for unborn beneficiaries by asserting in its footnote that \u201cChild and Child\u2019s issue cannot escape gift tax on the basis that the value of the gift is difficult to calculate,\u201d when in the facts of the CCA \u201cChild\u2019s issue\u201d currently include only Child\u2019s children<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\nIn fairness, the CCA does not explicitly state any intention to treat unborn contingent beneficiaries as donors, and the use of \u201cissue\u201d may be just an inclusive drafting convention that estate planners often use as well. Besides, unborn beneficiaries could never personally give their consent anyway. But does that mean that no loss of value attributable to the reimbursement authority is attributed to unborn beneficiaries? Or that the loss of value attributed to unborn beneficiaries is deemed to be part of the gift by their parent or other ancestor? Or that the loss of value attributed to unborn beneficiaries is just not treated as a gift. (Of course, if no value is attributed to unborn beneficiaries \u2013 taking a more or less \u201cqualified beneficiary\u201d approach \u2013 valuation might be a bit simpler, because it could bypass very speculative steps such as estimates of fertility.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
REFLECTIONS AND COMMENTS<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\nThe Role and Backstory of a CCA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nA Chief Counsel Advice typically arises from a specific audit or audits of a specific case or cases that are probably headed to litigation if they are not settled. For that reason, it is always possible that there is a backstory, not revealed in the CCA itself, that would explain the IRS\u2019s seemingly aggressive reaction. It is also reasonable to assume that a CCA is written to support the strongest possible litigation position, either to reinforce the litigation itself or to encourage the taxpayer to avoid litigation by agreeing to a settlement that is favorable to the IRS, which in this case might be an agreed higher value for the beneficiaries\u2019 purported gifts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The unique backstory of CCA 202352018 also includes that fact that it is addressed to two IRS Associate Area Counsels \u2013 Janice B. Geier in Portland, Oregon, and Sheila R. Pattison in Austin, Texas \u2013 who have been among the IRS counsel of record in a number of Tax Court cases, including cases well-known to estate planners. Ms. Pattison was counsel in the Texas cases of Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner<\/em>,115 T.C. 478 (2000), aff\u2019d in part, and rev\u2019d and rem\u2019d in part<\/em>, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000), involving the includability in a decedent\u2019s gross estate of the value of property that the decedent had transferred to a limited partnership, and Nelson v. Commissioner<\/em>, T.C. Memo. 2020-81, aff\u2019d<\/em>, 17 F.4th 556 (5th Cir. 2021), involving a defined value clause limited to appraisals obtained shortly after the dates of the transactions. Ms. Geier was counsel in the Strangi<\/em> case on remand, T.C. Memo. 2003-145, aff\u2019d<\/em>, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005), and in the Oregon case of Estate of Jones v. Commissioner<\/em>, T.C. Memo. 2019-101, involving \u201ctax-affecting\u201d in the valuation of interests in timber businesses. Thus, it is hard to view the CCA as a request by inexperienced lawyers for education from the National Office, and perhaps more likely that it should be viewed as a more strategic step in the context of anticipated litigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThe Frustrating Dilemma of the CCA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nEven so, CCA 202352018 will seem troubling to many. And rightly so. There does not appear to be any reason for the IRS to be concerned about the potential for placing more money in the hands of a grandparent where it could be subject to transfer tax in the near future, rather than continuing to accumulate it free of transfer tax to pass to the grandchildren or potentially even great-grandchildren. The CCA does not say a word to indicate why the IRS would or should be concerned about that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As noted above, Rev. Rul. 2004-64 confirmed that the grantor\u2019s payment of income tax on the income of a grantor trust is not a gift by the grantor to the trust\u2019s beneficiaries because it is paid in discharge of the grantor\u2019s own liability, imposed by section 671. In other words, when the trust was created as a grantor trust, the grantor gave the beneficiaries the value transferred to the trust, which was a taxable gift, and also gave the beneficiaries a framework within which the grantor would in effect pay the future income tax on their<\/em> income, but that<\/em> was not<\/em> a taxable gift. If the benefit of the arrangement to pay that income tax is not a transfer to the beneficiaries for gift tax purposes, how, it might be asked, can what amounts to the return of that benefit to the grantor, in whole or in part, be a transfer for gift tax purposes?<\/p>\n\n\n\nWhat About Simply Relinquishing the Grantor Trust Feature?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nOr suppose the grantor\u2019s retained power or other feature of the trust that makes it a grantor trust can be relinquished or renounced by the grantor. Whether, when, and how it can be relinquished or renounced might be difficult to determine and might vary widely, depending on the particular grantor trust power or feature involved, the other specific terms of the trust, the applicable state law, and sometimes the experience and perspective of the observer. The CCA does not clarify whether relinquishment or renunciation was an option in the case or cases it addresses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Of course, such relinquishment or renunciation could not possibly be a gift by the grantor \u2013 it leaves the grantor theoretically better off, not worse off. But neither can it be a gift by the beneficiaries \u2013 even though they are left theoretically worse off, they didn\u2019t do anything. So what if the beneficiaries consent to giving the trustee a discretionary reimbursement authority in order to dissuade the grantor from taking the more decisive action of relinquishment or renunciation? How could that be a gift by the beneficiaries, when they theoretically gain, not lose, from avoiding the grantor\u2019s more decisive action of relinquishment or renunciation?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Often (although not necessarily always), the grantor\u2019s consideration of relinquishment or renunciation of grantor trust status may be prompted by the anticipation of an extraordinary gain, perhaps from the sale of an asset that has been the trust\u2019s sole or principal asset and has performed very well, but in the view of the trustee has reached the point where it would be prudent to replace it with other assets, possibly more diversified, that the trustee believes have better income and\/or appreciation potential for the future. It would probably be quite aggressive and risky to suppose that under the terms of the trust the grantor could suspend the grantor trust feature for only one taxable year. (But watch for it \u2013 we might now start seeing trusts drafted that way \u2013 although I do not recommend it!) The presence of a discretionary reimbursement authority that would permit reimbursement, perhaps even partial reimbursement, only for the taxable year of that transaction (in the trustee\u2019s discretion if the trustee finds that to be in the best interests of the beneficiaries to whom the trustee owes a fiduciary duty), would both meet the grantor\u2019s concerns and serve the beneficiaries\u2019 interests, and would leave in place the beneficiaries\u2019 right to expect the grantor, again, to effectively pay the income tax on those beneficiaries\u2019 income in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In fact, wouldn\u2019t the strong principle of fiduciary duty<\/em> that governs all the trustee\u2019s actions always govern any<\/em> discretionary reimbursement by the trustee of the grantor pursuant to the type of discretion added to the terms of the trust in the facts of CCA 202352018? If so, shouldn\u2019t that lead to the conclusion that in fact the beneficiaries are not hurt<\/em> but benefited<\/em> \u2013 that is, they will not lose<\/em> and they may gain<\/em> \u2013 by the presence of such a power? So how can the creation of such a power be a gift by beneficiaries? Again, the CCA does not say a word to indicate that the IRS has considered such obvious facts of life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n